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Abstract
We propose a novel laboratory experiment to document the pressure to share income within
social networks in Africa. We find that the redistributive pressure exerted via the possibility
of receiving a claim increases altruism, while the possibility of hiding from such claim
reduces it. Our results indicate that sharing norms are crucial drivers of giving to other mem-
bers of the network. We also find that pressure to share has a detrimental effect on the
undertaking of profitable but risky investments.
1. Introduction
The sharing of resources within social networks is a strong norm in many developing coun-
tries. Cash, goods and in kind services are transferred to other members either voluntarily or
as a response to a direct request [1–9]. This behavior can be thought to be an expression of
altruistic preferences towards relatives and nonrelatives [10–12]. An important issue is
whether altruism is instead the product of binding sharing norms that may have potentially
negative economic implications both in terms of less investment in income generating activi-
ties and an increase in resources spent on hiding income. As noted by [13] (p.192), the rich
may help the poor ‘less from a spirit of liberality than as response to the palpable pressure their
neighbours and kin brought to bear upon them.’ A recent and growing body of literature,
using both observational and experimental approaches, provides empirical evidence that this
may be the case. It shows, indeed, that individuals may implement costly activities such as hid-
ing to prevent redistributive pressure [14–20].
In this paper we use a laboratory set up to provide experimental evidence showing how
explicit redistributive pressure affects both an individual’s decision to share resources and to
undertake a profitable investment. The laboratory environment is particularly useful in
addressing these research questions (see [21] for a comprehensive review). First, the random
allocation of individuals to different conditions allows for the estimation of effects that are not
correlated with other variables. Findings are therefore not prone to omitted variables bias. Sec-
ond, the mechanisms underlying a specific empirical relation can be further studied and
probed. We, thus, provide an experimental design where sharing pressure and the possibility
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747 May 21, 2019 1 / 19
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Di Falco S, Lokina R, Martinsson P, Pin P
(2019) Altruism and the pressure to share: Lab
evidence from Tanzania. PLoS ONE 14(5):
e0212747. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0212747
Editor: Pablo Brañas-Garza, Universidad Loyola
Andalucia, SPAIN
Received: April 24, 2018
Accepted: February 10, 2019
Published: May 21, 2019
Copyright: © 2019 Di Falco et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are
provided in the Supporting Information.
Funding: Financial support from the World Bank
via the Environment for Development Initiative
(EfD), and by the Italian Ministry of Education
Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale (PRIN)
Grant 2015592CTH, is gratefully acknowledged.
The funders had no role in study design, data
collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
to hide from it can be manipulated. We then observe both the subjects’ investment decisions
and their redistribution of resources within their social network.
The experiment was conducted in rural Tanzania and it was framed in the context of a typi-
cal social network in a developing country. We used a modified dictator game with multiple
recipients where there is an important interplay between investment decisions by the senders,
explicit claims from the recipients and possibility to hide at a cost. In some treatments, recipi-
ents are thus allowed to claim some of the resources from the senders they are related to, while
in others the senders had the possibility to hide their resources at a cost. This is in the spirit of
[22–23]. Both experiments indeed allow for the possibility to opt out from a situation of giving.
This experimental condition allows us to explicitly study the role of pressure on investment
and resource sharing. This is a novel experimental feature that allows to explicitly and simulta-
neously testing behavioral responses both in terms of investment and giving decisions under
redistributive pressure.
Context of social ties
Framing and creating artificial social ties in the laboratory is used in studies on group identities
and individual decisions (e.g., [24–25]). This is a very central social organization and key provider
of social capital in Sub Saharan Africa. Differently from other types of networks (e.g., friendships),
membership is determined via bloodlines or marriage and it is not “the result of individual
choice” [26]. Ties created by bloodlines promote altruism and regulate access to resources and ser-
vices (e.g. [27–28]) as well as govern social relationships and marital customs. Redistribution and
sharing of resources within social network is a means to provide economic and social security ([1]
and [29]). In the absence of formal insurance and credit markets, these networks provide opportu-
nities for risk sharing and a social safety net for the unlucky ([3], [5], [9] and [30–31]). This type
of social networks may also matter because “the ties of common experience, altruism and heritage
among family members enable families to transcend some of the information problems barring
the development of impersonal markets” ([32], p.1167). [33] extend the basic mutual insurance
under imperfect commitment model, and consider the implications of altruism entering into
sharing relations. Altruism tends to ameliorate commitment problems, and increases the potential
gains from income pooling and mutual insurance ([34]). Members of the social network may thus
claim assistance from others when necessary. Networks may also help to restrain opportunistic
behavior of members or free riding, lower transaction costs, facilitate the exchange of information,
and enable communities to overcome social dilemma situations.
Emphasizing the strength of the moral obligations towards the less lucky members of the
network, [35] refer to the concept of “forced solidarity”. They show that, in Cameroon, a sig-
nificant portion of sample individuals borrowed money at a cost even if they had available sav-
ings. They argue that the reason for this costly behavior was to avoid the pressure from others
to share their resources by using borrowing to signal financial difficulties. Social sanctions
(e.g., social stigmas) may be faced by those who defect from the moral imperative of sharing
([36]). [2], for instance, discusses the role of witchcraft and ostracism. These are very impor-
tant sanctioning mechanisms that make it unlikely for individuals to avoid the sharing requests
of the network ([37]). Social stigma, as well as implications of any retaliation, can “fall on the
defectors as well as on other members of their clan, increasing the cost of breaching the con-
tract” ([38], p.1733).
Findings
Our main results are as follows. First, we find that sharing pressure significantly increases
altruistic behavior. The highest level of giving is, indeed, found when subjects are exposed to
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explicit sharing pressure from perfectly informed members of their social network (interest-
ingly, 96% of the receivers in the claim treatment made a claim to others). This result is consis-
tent with existing findings, from both developed and developing countries, interpreting hiding
as a strategy to reduce giving e.g. redistributing a smaller fraction of resources ([18–19, 22–23,
39–40]). Second, we find evidence that the size of investments are smaller when the redistribu-
tive pressure is larger and that individuals use hiding (at a cost) to fend off requests from other
members of the network. Third, we find that income affects giving decisions only when redis-
tributive pressure is higher. This suggests that giving behavior is based also on social norms
and it may not only be driven by altruistic preferences ([10, 41–42]).
These results are relevant for three broad strands of literature. First, and most obvious, is
the literature on altruism and giving ([10–12, 43–45]). Our study provides a crucial alternative
explanation of sharing resources. The act of giving (implying resource sharing) can be a reflec-
tion of pure altruistic preferences, or it can be the result of strong sharing norms that might be
amplified by pressure from others. This has been termed in the behavioral literature ‘involun-
tary giving’ ([23, 28, 46]). Using the laboratory environment, we find that a non-negligible part
of sharing is the results of social norms and sense of duty. Second, our study relates to the
strand of literature on the economic implications of social networks. Households anticipating
that their income will be subject to redistributive pressure may try to avoid this by making ill-
suited economic decisions. They may, for instance, change their consumption, saving and
investment decisions ([15, 47–48]). [18] provided some experimental evidence showing that
females are less likely to undertake profitable, but risky prospects when observed by their rela-
tives. [19] showed that sharing pressure reduces the productive incentives of entrepreneurs,
leading them to invest less in their business than they otherwise would. [49] also showed that
individuals belonging to larger social networks are less likely to adopt some agricultural tech-
nologies in rural Ethiopia. In most of these papers, avoiding the pressure to share is the key
explanation behind the observed pattern in the outcome variables. In this literature sharing
pressure is inferred by the simple comparison of a situation in which one’s resources or invest-
ments are observable to the others, versus a situation where hiding them is possible. Our
experimental design aims to probe this mechanism further by explicitly relating claims to hid-
ing and investment decisions. Third, our paper relates to the small body of literature on
income hiding in village economies. Hiding income can be an explanation for incomplete risk
sharing and therefore may play a very important role in explaining barriers to insurance in a
developing country context ([17, 19]). It also plays a role in the possibility to achieve first best
allocation in dynamic consumption models ([50]). To our knowledge, this is the first paper
providing the laboratory evidence of the hiding income hypothesis. Our main novelty lies in
the fact that we include explicitly peers in the experimental setup, and we allow them to make
explicit claims. We propose also a hypothesis based on rational inattention that is consistent
with what we find in the experiment.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our experimental design and general pro-
cedures. Section 3 details experimental results. Section 4 investigates the nature of the norms
followed by subjects with a simple theoretical approach. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Experimental design and procedures
The key feature of our experimental design is to replicate a real life situation, typical in context
of a Sub Saharan Africa, where people can make a risky investment decision and they poten-
tially face claims to share their resources with others. We, therefore, created fictitious social
networks from groups of 6 people with different artificial ties, as described in Table 1. There
are 2 types of individuals in the network: type A subjects (senders) and type B subjects
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(receivers). Subjects are presented with hypothetical links characterized by different degrees of
genetic distance. The relationship between type A and B thus varies artificially in the degree of
closeness. Every subject in a group is therefore interacting with what corresponds in the fram-
ing of the experiment to a close family member, a member of the extended family or a village
neighbor. This structure can be described as a ring structure where links partially overlap. So,
for instance, B2 is close member of the family of A2, member of the extended family of A1 and
neighbor of A3.
Different relationships represent different strength of ties. Different strength of ties implies
different levels of altruism and sharing ([51]). To capture this feature we differentiate the maxi-
mal amount of giving according to different strength of social ties. Subjects A can therefore
freely give a maximum of 50% of their money to a member of the close family (e.g. siblings), a
maximum of 30% to a member of her extended family, and a maximum of 20% to a neighbor.
This bounding structure, while allows participants to freely allocate their resources to the oth-
ers, does emphasizes the fact that the closeness of a relationship is important ([11–12]). Find-
ings from dictator games also show that as social relationships become more distant less
resource are given (e.g., [52–53]). This is also consistent with the notion of altruism towards
relatives in economics ([28, 51, 54]), evolutionary biology and psychology. Individuals will
preferentially assist their close relatives ([27, 29, 55]). Help and cooperation is also more likely
to happen among relatives rather than non-relatives ([56]).
Each subject has access to the same structured social network. They were randomly
assigned into one of 4 conditions (described below) as well as to the role of being type A or
type B subjects. Conditions are all characterized by anonymity and no real-life elements were
present in the analysis. Subjects could not see with whom they were matched with or what role
subjects in other rooms were assigned. A chart of the structure of the network was displayed in
the rooms in order to facilitate the understanding of the matching process.
The experiment is played in one shot. Type A subjects are endowed with 5000 ECU (Exper-
imental Currency Units) corresponding to 5000 Tanzanian Shillings, while type B subjects are
endowed with 2000 ECU. The daily wage for a participant in the region is 7000 shillings a day.
The first decision that type A subjects have to make is how much of the endowment to invest
in a risky project. If the project is successful, the amount invested will be tripled. If it is instead
unsuccessful there is no return and the investment is lost. The type A subjects can invest how
much they want of they own endowment (from 0 to 5000 ECU). The probability of a successful
outcome is 50%. Once we have determined the outcome of the investment by tossing a coin,
the type A subject decide how much she would like to give of her resources to the three type B
subjects who are related to her (her social network). We will observe this giving decision under
a number of different experimental conditions. There are two key parameters in our design: (i)
claim–whether or not the type B subject can claim money from the type A subjects in her net-
work; and, (ii) hide–whether or not the type A subject can hide her income at a cost following
a positive outcome from the risky investment. It should be stressed that no deception was in
place. The set of instructions given to the B players in fact mentioned that the A players would
have the possibility to hide at a cost. For example, in the claim and hide condition a B player
who was informed that the A player paired with her had 5000 ECU could infer that either the
Table 1. Social network in the experiment.
Subject B1 Subject B2 Subject B3
Subject A1 Close family Neighbor Extended family
Subject A2 Extended family Close family Neighbor
Subject A3 Neighbor Extended family Close family
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t001
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latter did not invest or could have decided to hide resources. The 2x2 design generates 4 condi-
tions in total: one control and three treatments. In the baseline (control) condition, the type B
subjects are assigned a passive role. In essence, this is a standard dictator game (with multiple
receivers and senders) and it is used to measure pro-sociality without any external pressure
from members of their network.
The pressure for sharing is explicit in the claim experimental condition (or treatment). In
this condition, the type B subjects are able to make a claim on resources from any type A sub-
ject who is a member of their network. This treatment captures the extent of network redistrib-
utive pressure. Claims are not binding by design. Type A subjects can give zero if they wish.
Again, we impose different (and consistent with the previous) bounds to distinguish and char-
acterize the strength of the ties. The maximum amount that this type B subject can claim is
50% from a member of her close family, 30% from extended family and 20% from a neighbor,
consistent with the type A subject’s giving constraints. This implies that both sharing and hid-
ing are affected by genetic distance in the same way. Subjects A potentially share more with
closer kins an face higher costs when they hide from their closer relative. This prevents possible
strategic behavior as one player could in principle condition the choice on hiding on the out-
come of the lottery. The way the social ties bind is the same. All type B subjects linked to a type
A subject will know her total income after the risky decision is made. To allow for a possible
evasive response from the sharing pressure we introduced a hide treatment. In this treatment
the type A subject can hide her positive income from the investment decision. This comes at a
different cost: 500 ECU to hide from close family, 300 ECU to hide from extended family and
200 ECU to hide earnings from a neighbor. It is, therefore, morally more costly to hide from
closely related individuals rather than more distant ones. Obviously, type A subject must make
this decision before the outcome of the risky investment is known. These two choices can be
thought as simultaneous. If the type A subject decides to hide the outcomes of the investment
decision, the type B subject will be informed that the outcome equals the initial endowment
(i.e. 5000 ECU) even if they made a successful investment. In the event of a loss, the (true)
income of the type A subject after the loss is revealed by type B subjects (i.e. 5000 ECU minus
the invested amount). This replicates the real-life situation where the initial investment has
been hidden, but no effort is taken to hide the loss at the time the loss is realized.
In a last treatment called hide and claim, while type A subjects can hide their investment
outcome, type B subjects can still make a claim. This condition assesses if hiding at a cost is a
viable strategy to buffer against the explicit sharing pressure exerted by the network. We sum-
marize our experimental design in Tables 2 and 3. It can be seen how the design allows us to
investigate both separate and joint effect of hiding and claims on investment decisions as well
as on sharing behavior.
Table 2. Experimental design.
Give without claims Give in response to claims
Hiding income not possible Baseline Claim
Hiding income is possible Hide Hide and claim
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t002
Table 3. Resources sent to network members (t test, difference in means).
No claims Claims P-values
Hiding income not possible 1093 1806 0.09
Hiding income is possible 418 588 0.48
P-values 0.01 0.01
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t003
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In the hide and claim treatment, type A subjects make the decision to hide their final
income from any or all the type B subjects related to them before any investment is made.
They then decide how much (if any) of their initial resources to invest in a risky prospect and
how much to save. Following the outcome, if the type A subject has not chosen to hide the out-
come, their final income is communicated to the type B subjects (in the no hiding treatment).
In the case of the type A subject deciding to hide the outcome, the type B subjects will be told
that the type A subject has 5000 ECU in the case of a successful investment, or the actual
amount remaining after investment in the case of failure. The costs of hiding and the maxi-
mum giving and claim amounts remain as in other treatments. The complete game theoretical
representation of conditions is presented in Fig 1.
Procedures
A total of 240 undergraduate students were recruited at the Sokoine University of Agriculture
(SUA) in Morogoro, Tanzania, which is the second largest university in Tanzania. The univer-
sity gives courses in a wide range of subjects such as agriculture, business, development, geog-
raphy and planning. Students participated voluntarily in response to advertising for a paid
decision-making experiment. The IRB was not needed as the study was not of medical nature.
The treatments are not drug or placebo. No physical or psychological risk is entailed. Partici-
pants gave their informed consent to participate at the beginning of the experiment by ticking
a box on the consent form to express consent. The experiments were always played in condi-
tion of anonymity. Upon arriving at the experiment location, participants were randomly allo-
cated to different room representing different roles. When the experiment began, they
Fig 1. Game theoretical representation of the four experimental conditions. Note first that from a game theoretical
perspective the moves of B are irrelevant information for A, even if she has other regarding preferences (i.e., this is just ‘cheap
talk’). So, from a theoretical perspective, these four games in extensive form are equivalent, however we define payoffs. Note
also that B moves only in the ‘claim’ treatments, but her information set is different in the two cases. In the ‘no hide & claim’
case, B has perfect knowledge of the history of the game when she makes the claim. In the ‘hide & claim’ case, when B has to
move, she faces uncertainty if A has chosen to hide (in the left arm), and in that position (in that information set) she also does
not know the investment that A made.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.g001
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received oral and written instructions in both Swahili and English. A short quiz was then dis-
tributed to ensure that the tasks were fully understood. The correct answers were written sub-
sequently on the black board. Participants then had to possibility to ask any remaining
questions they had in privacy. Each subject would share the room with others playing the same
role as them. They could not therefore see with whom they were paired with. All answers and
decision taken in the experiments were private and could not be observed by others. In the
room, subjects were given additional time to read the instructions and they were then asked to
fill a small questionnaire to collect some basic socio-economic data. Payments were made at
the end of the experiment in the respective rooms. Each room was vacated in a sequential fash-
ion to avoid that participants with different roles could exit the building at the same time.
Given that we address an investment decision, risk preferences may matter. We therefore con-
ducted a very simple elicitation task. Participant were asked to self -assess their risk tolerance
on a scale 1 to 6. We then used this simple hypothetical measure as a control in the regressions
(see, [57] for the validity of hypothetical measures and [58], for the mapping of elicited risk
preferences in real life in developing countries). The full list of variables and their summary is
reported in S1 Table. The balance test, reported in S2 Table, shows some differences in some
controls variables. It should be noted, though, that only the variable married is, in fact, statisti-
cally significant across the different treatments. While the differences do not seem suggestive
of any systematic pattern, they clearly highlight a situation that is not ideal.
3. Results
In this section we present the results of the set of the experiments. We first present the simple t
tests (Table 3), and then we present the econometric models of the giving analysis and the
results of the investment behavior. We find that subjects that faced redistributive pressure
increased giving behavior. Sharing pressure plays a significant role in determining the amount
of resources that will be distributed within the network. Type A subjects send the largest
amount (1806 ECU about 26% of the average experimental endowment) to the type B subjects
if they are exposed to explicit claims and cannot hide their income at a cost (in the claim no
hide experimental condition). A polar opposite situation is presented in the hide and no claim
treatment. In this condition type B subjects are not able to make claims; thus type A subjects
can further reduce sharing by the possibility of hiding their resources. In the hide and no claim
treatment we find that the lowest amount of resource is sent, on average, by type A subjects
(418 ECU about 7% of their experimental endowment) to type B subjects. The experimental
condition that does not allow individuals to be exposed to redistributive pressure (claims) is
the standard dictator game. In this set up senders also do not have the possibility to hide at a
cost. The amount of resources sent to the network is 1093 ECU (15% of the experimental
endowment). Of special interest is the experimental condition where we can simultaneously
observe redistributive pressure and the possibility to escape from it. That is, the claim and hide
treatment. We test, therefore, how much giving in response to claims is sensitive to the possi-
bility of hiding. We find that in the claim and hide treatment, type A subject send 588 ECU in
response to the claims of the type B subject. This corresponds to only 8% of the average experi-
mental income. A figure that stands in stark contrasts with the 26% found in the absence of the
possibility to hide at a cost.
We also run a regression model (reported in Table 4) to test the impact of the different
treatments on the amount sent from type A subjects to the type B subjects while adding a large
set of controls such as age, gender, religion, land owned by family, if help their parents in farm-
ing activities, year of study, marital status, and elicited risk preferences. Results, reported in
column (1), are very consistent with the simple differences in means.
Altruism and the pressure to share
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The omitted category is the baseline scenario (standard dictator game: no claims and no
hiding). Results show that the presence of an explicit claim from one’s social network increases
giving by the senders while the experimental condition as the opposite effect of reducing it.
Column (2) reports the estimation results with the inclusion of the total amount of claims
received by the senders as a control. This is a very relevant variable as it allows to control for
the extent of the sharing pressure. Its estimated coefficient is positive and highly statistically
significant. Senders increase their transfers when facing larger requests.
Our design also allows us to test if hypothetical genetic distance matters in the way claims
are dealt with. We test if senders are giving more in response to claims that are placed by other
participants that are presented to them as closer relatives. We thus test more resources are sent
to the members of the social network with whom there are hypothetical closer links. To take
into consideration for the simultaneity of the decisions taken by the sender a Seemingly Unre-
lated Regression (SUR) model is adopted ([59]). We therefore estimate the three models simul-
taneously and allow for the correlation in the error terms. Table 5 shows that results are
Table 4. Resources sent to network members. OLS estimates.
Baseline: Standard dictator game (no claims, no hiding)
Controls Controls and claims
(1) (2)
Claims 566.5��� 1075.7���
(85.27) (228.1)
Hiding and claims -957.3��� 0
(163.1) (0.00000284)
Hiding and no claims -642.9��� 0
(102.2) (1.16e-13)
Age -18.48 -34.20
(23.62) (37.53)
Gender -25.99 181.8���
(235.9) (48.93)
Religion 8.388 -705.0���
(300.1) (197.3)
Help parents 300.5� 245.5���
(160.0) (64.05)
Land 0.779��� -4.797
(0.0594) (5.897)
Risk aversion 53.49 66.92���
(71.08) (11.84)
Experimental endowment 0.126 0.155���
(0.0789) (0.00760)
Married 710.2��� 406.4���
(273.4) (14.00)
Claims received 0.0935
(0.163)
N 120 60
adj. R2 0.386 0.541
Session clustered standard errors in parentheses� p< 0.10, �� p< 0.05, ��� p< 0.01. Small cluster correction applied
([60]). All specifications include year of study fixed effects. Constants not reported.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t004
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qualitatively consistent with the simple testing of difference in means. Standard errors were
clustered at the session level. Correction for small number of clusters was applied ([60]). The
omitted reference group is the hiding and no claim treatment. We make this choice because
this is the benchmark case where individuals are exposed to the lower levels of peer pressure
from the network. We add a set of controls in column (1) and column (2). In the latter we pres-
ent the results where we control for the amount of the claims presented by the member of the
close family, the extended family and the neighbor respectively.
Hiding does not only allow giving less in response to claims from the social network. It
does also allow giving zero. Fig 2 reports the frequency of zero resources transferred in
response to claims under the two different conditions no hiding and hiding.
Only 16% of participants give zero to members of the network when hiding is not possible.
The remaining 84%, instead, shares resources. The difference is statistically significant at 5%.
The difference is much less striking (and not statistically significant) when hiding is possible.
In this condition, 43% of participants give zero while the remaining 57% share resources in
response to claims.
Table 5. Total resources sent to network according to their degree of relationship. SUR results.
Sent to close family Sent to extended family Sent to extended family Sent to neighbor Sent to neighbor
Controls Controls and claims Controls Controls and claims Controls Controls and claims
Baseline: Standard dictator game (no claims, no hiding)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Claims 338.6� 503.1� 141.1 237.2 135.7 237.2
(183.0) (301.7) (102.1) (185.5) (86.74) (185.5)
Hiding and claims -419.9 . -149.4 . -16.96 .
(285.0) . (159.0) . (85.64) .
Hiding and no claims -319.0� . -225.7�� . -70.79 .
(169.7) . (94.67) . (81.10) .
Age -9.537 -7.602 5.073 1.891 -1.098 1.891
(16.83) (19.94) (9.388) (11.97) (7.177) (11.97)
Gender -22.32 91.01 -52.18 -69.35 55.81 -69.35
(129.1) (175.4) (72.01) (107.6) (61.94) (107.6)
Religion -23.55 -463.1� 0.296 -189.1 -5.539 -189.1
(186.3) (265.0) (103.9) (162.9) (88.80) (162.9)
Help parents 138.5 -30.87 94.05 112.1 63.72 112.1
(130.4) (204.8) (72.71) (125.3) (62.57) (125.3)
Land 0.287�� -2.927 0.327��� 2.124 0.174��� 2.124
(0.129) (6.728) (0.0722) (4.140) (0.0621) (4.140)
Risk aversion 37.13 22.88 18.16 -10.54 2.691 -10.54
(43.79) (69.14) (24.43) (42.43) (20.98) (42.43)
Experimental endowment 0.0675��� 0.0453�� 0.0274��� 0.0142 0.0300��� 0.0142
(0.0140) (0.0230) (0.00783) (0.0123) (0.00672) (0.0123)
Married 299.0 154.9 -14.16 -28.97 -28.97
(254.7) (333.0) (142.1) (204.8) (204.8)
Claims received 0.219��� 0.189��� 0.205���
(0.0423) (0.0355) (0.0528)
N 120 60 120 60 120 60
Standard errors in parentheses� p < 0.10, �� p < 0.05, ��� p < 0.01. All specifications include year of study fixed effects. Constants not reported.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t005
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Investment decisions
We now turn to the investment analysis to investigate some of the possible economic implica-
tions of sharing redistributive pressure. We test how the share of the endowment that is
invested is affected by different experimental conditions. Hiding and not claim is the reference.
Table 6 column (1) and (2) shows the results of the OLS and Tobit regression respectively. The
key idea is to test how exposure to sharing pressure may push individuals into lower invest-
ment decisions. We consider the condition no claim and hiding as the one where senders are
exposed to the lowest level of pressure. They do not receive claims and they can also show to
the others lower levels of income. This is the omitted category in the regression models. As
above, we find that redistributive pressure does matter. All the conditions that entail being
exposed to claims indeed are negatively correlated with both total investment and the share of
resources that is invested. We also find that hiding provides the behavioral shelter to reduce
sharing pressure.
4. What is the social norm?
In general, there are three different sources of altruism in a context like the present one. First,
altruism could be the manifestation of the Nash equilibrium of what is actually a repeated
game, possibly unobserved by the researcher. People, thus, share some of their resources in
one interaction because they expect to meet again. Second, it can be an intrinsic specification
of subjects’ utility function: people feel better when sharing, because they are intrinsically moti-
vated and have inbuilt in their utility function also the wellbeing of other subjects (see [61]).
Third, it can be the result of a social norm that people follow. [62] is among the first to distin-
guish the causes of observed altruism in the context of the dictator game. Alger and Weibull
[28, 46] discuss this at length in motivating their model of coerced altruism. More recently,
[63] proposes a model based on pure altruism and shows how giving is affected by income.
[64] distinguish between giving (moved by pure altruism) and giving in (moved by compliance
to social norms). [65] highlighted the importance of social norms of redistribution, in Sub-
Saharan Africa. [66] provided complementary evidence showing that in Tanzanian villages,
Fig 2. Frequency of zero resource given in response to claims. The impact of hiding.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.g002
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individuals found it very difficult not to help one another. The experimental approach allows
us to provide a possible explanation for the underlying psychological mechanism at play. Our
experimental design rules out the first case: identities are anonymous and subjects cannot
reciprocate. So, we can focus exclusively on the other two sources: real altruism or social norm
of sharing. If subjects follow a social norm, it is also important to find evidence on how this
rule of thumb actually works in the cognitive process of subjects.
Sensitivity of type A subjects to the outcomes of the lottery
To obtain a first indication of the behavior of people, let us consider Fig 3 below. It does pres-
ent a summary of the behavior of type A subjects. On the x-axis we have the aggregate income
after the investment decision is made and outcome seen (minus the cost of hiding, if that
choice was possible and taken), on the y-axis we have the aggregate amount of giving to the
three type B subjects that the type A subject choses, possibly after claims have been made. First
of all, note that while in the hide treatment, all type A subjects decided to hide, in the hide and
Table 6. Investment analysis.
Total investment—OLS Share of the experimental endowment
invested—Tobit
Baseline: no claims hiding
(1) (2)
No hiding no claim -588.1��� -0.0849�
(51.44) (0.0471)
Hiding and claim -278.4��� -0.0403
(71.52) (0.0749)
No hiding and claim -249.7��� -0.0451
(65.22) (0.0492)
Age 13.62 0.00226
(8.697) (0.00467)
Gender 376.9� 0.0832��
(205.5) (0.0358)
Religion 471.1��� 0.0671
(133.5) (0.0517)
Help parents -335.9 -0.0687�
(221.3) (0.0362)
Land 0.311��� 0.0000567
(0.0334) (0.0000359)
Risk aversion 6.875 0.00818
(42.64) (0.0122)
Experimental endowment 0.0790��� 0.0000145���
(0.0272) (0.00000390)
Married 82.63 0.00245
(154.3) (0.0707)
N 120 120
adj. R2 0.222
Standard errors in parentheses� p < 0.10, �� p < 0.05, ��� p < 0.01. Small cluster correction applied ([60]) in (1). All
specifications include year of study fixed effects. Constant not reported. Session clustered standard errors in
parentheses� p < 0.10, �� p < 0.05, ��� p < 0.01. Small cluster correction applied ([60]). All specifications include
year of study fixed effects. Constant not reported.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.t006
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claim treatment this choice was split. Overall, the linear fit shows that only those type A sub-
jects that are facing simultaneously the no hide and the claim conditions seem to condition the
amount given to type B subjects on the outcome of the investment. All the others seem indif-
ferent. We ran regression with the same battery of controls used previously. For the 30 A sub-
jects in the ‘nhc’ case the coefficient of income on quantity given is 0.25, positive at the 99%
confidence level. For all the 44 subjects that are either in the ‘hiding and claiming and no hid-
ing’ case or in the ‘no hiding and claiming’ case, the coefficient is 0.26, positive above the
99.9% confidence level. As is evident from Fig 3, in all the other cases (72 A subjects) we have
that this coefficient is only 0.02 and is not statistically different from 0. This outcome seems to
suggest that subjects, who are not expecting a claim (or expect a claim from people who do not
know the outcome of the lottery), decide how much to give even before knowing the outcome
of the investment and try to adhere to that choice.
The concept of ‘fairness’ that they adopt is social, and is independent of the (privately
known only in case of success) outcome of the investment.
For this reason, we propose an approach based on a simple hypothesis, discussed here
below.
Fig 3. Income before giving vs aggregate amount given of all A types. Colors and linear fits are for the different treatments: hnc is “hide, no claim” (in this
case all 30 A subjects decided to hide), nhnc is “no hide, no claim”, nhc is “no hide, claim”, and finally hc is “hide, claim”. In the fourth case 14 A subjects
decided to hide, while the other 16 decided not to.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747.g003
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The rational inattention hypothesis
We focus on type A subjects—the decision makers. First of all we assume that a type A subject
has the possibility to compute, on the basis of her endowment w, the amount ~yðwÞ � w, which
is what she perceives as socially fair to give out, and depends on her own preferences, her per-
ception of the social norms and on what she guesses that the other may think. For simplicity,
we assume that ~yðwÞ is linear in w (say, it is always 30% of w). Then, we assume that she has a
utility function of the following form:
uðw; yÞ ¼ w   y   bjy   ~yðwÞj;
where y is the actual aggregate amount that she gives to B subjects, β>1 is a constant, and |�| is
just the absolute value. This functional form is a version of the benchmark on other regarding
preferences from [67].
To be able to interpret the behavior of our subjects, we borrow from the literature on dual
reasoning in decision making (see [68] for a recent survey) and suppose that the type A subject
establishes what is the optimal y to give out before she actually knows the outcome of w: we
call y0 the outcome of this first estimation. Since β>1 and ~yðwÞ is linear, the optimal y0 com-
puted at this stage will actually be equal to ~yðEðwÞÞ. Then, after the outcome w is realized, the
decision maker may stick to the initial value y0 ¼ ~yðEðwÞÞ, or re-compute ~yðwÞ, with the
updated realized value of w. However, re-computing ~yðwÞ comes at a (cognitive) cost. In par-
ticular, before starting to think about the problem, a decision maker decides non-rationally
(we could say: by instinct) if she wants to use a low or high cognitive effort.
A very recent literature ([69–70] has formalized the concept of rational inattention. In this
theoretical framework the decision maker tends to be biased towards ex-ante optimal actions,
and if the information that she receives ex-post is not surprising, she will stick to the original
decision (the choice of sticking to ex-ante optimal actions is called frictional decision making).
In the literature, this typically happens if the stakes at play change (e.g., [71]) or if the framing
of the problem changes (e.g., [72]), and the use of dual reasoning in intertemporal choices has
been used by Fudenberg and Levine [73–74] to explain behavioral anomalies in consumption
choices. In all these applications, the decision maker is supposed to be in isolation. Here, we
want to understand under which circumstances the type A subjects will incur the cognitive
cost of processing new information, or instead they will choose rational inattention and keep
the choice that they made before the outcome of the lottery was known. We argue that in the
context of our experiment, type A subjects, as decision makers, incur this cost only if there is a
social pressure (a request from type B players) that is justified on hard evidence (i.e., the type B
players know the outcome w), otherwise the decision maker will stick to y0.
It is important to stress one aspect. In some cases, not taking into account the new realized
w may seem as an ex-post justification from the type A subjects: if they win in the lottery they
have a psychological justification to give out less than they would do if they were re-processing
the correct fair amount of ~yðwÞ. However, it is important to focus on those A subjects who
actually loose in the lottery. From the design of our experiment, not re-computing ~yðwÞ after a
loss comes at a monetary cost, and this can be only justified, in the context of this modelling
approach, assuming the cognitive cost that this new computation implies.
It is remarkable, from our experiment, that it is in the treatments no hide and claim and
hide and claim (in the latter case, for those 16 subjects who decided not to hide) that not re-
computing ~yðwÞ after a loss comes at a monetary cost. It seems to us that this can be only justi-
fied, at least in the context of our modelling approach, assuming that this new computation
implies a large cognitive cost.
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Consistency of the rational inattention hypothesis with the data
To test the implications of our hypothesis, we proceed in two steps, considering the shares of
wealth given out by the type A subjects under different treatments, choices, and outcomes of
the lottery.
First, we compare the cases where the combination of no hiding and claim is not present at
a cost for the subjects (i.e., all the subjects in the treatment no hide and claim and the 14 sub-
jects who decided to hide in the treatment hide and claim) with those 30 type A subjects who
cannot hide but receive no claim. In all these cases, the type A subjects turns out to be indiffer-
ent to the outcome of the lottery when giving. However, the first 44 have paid for hiding and
they seem to externalize this cost to the type B subjects giving less to them. The amount given
by the 44 subjects who pay for hiding was around 3% (2% to external, 2% to neighbors, 5% to
close family members); instead the amount given by the 33 subjects who receive no claims for
free was around 6% (6% to external, 3% to neighbors, 8% to close family members). Applying
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test, thes average outcomes are statistically differ-
ent at 90%, even if they are not independently in the 3 separated cases.
This outcome seems not consistent with pure altruistic motivations (because paying for
hiding is a waste for both players), but is consistent with the fact that some type A subjects try
to avoid the pressure for giving out because of social norms, even if it comes at a cost for the
type B subjects. Then, to better understand what drives or dual reasoning approach, we study
those type A subjects who actually lost the lottery. If we consider the treatment hide and claim,
where 16 subjects chose not to hide (among them 11 lost the investment) while 14 chose to
hide (among them 7 lost the investment). The amount given by the 11 unlucky subjects who
decided not to hide was around 2% (2% to external, 1% to neighbors, 3% to close family mem-
bers), instead the amount given by the 7 unlucky subjects who decided to hide was around
10% (10% to external, 7% to neighbors, 13% to close). Even with these low numbers, applying
Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test, the average outcomes are statistically differ-
ent at 99%, even independently in the 3 separated cases of external, neighbors and close. In
principle, choice could depend also on the amount that is lost. However, our observations are
too few to make any differentiated claim for those subjects who lost more or less of their
resources in the lottery. This indicates that those subjects who decided to hide stick to a ‘fair’
proportion of their wealth to share with the others, independently on the outcome of the lot-
tery. This result is consistent with a dual reasoning approach, as the one we propose above,
where the A subject switch from a low to a high cognitive effort, after the outcome of the lot-
tery, only if they know that the B subjects are aware of this outcome.
Moreover, and still on this second point, comparing the two treatments nhc and nhnc, We
see that those who lost in the nhc treatment provide significantly less amount to the type B sub-
jects than those who lost in the nhnc treatment: in both cases they know that the type B subjects
know that they lost the lottery, but in the latter case the type B subjects are not going to ask for
a specific amount. We compare 7 A subjects who lost the lottery in the nhnc case with the 13 A
subjects who lost the lottery in the nhnc case. Even with these low numbers, applying Kruskal-
Wallis equality-of-populations rank test, the average share of wealth given out to B subjects are
statistically different at 90%, independently in the 3 separated cases of external, neighbors and
close. So, according to the dual reasoning approach, what makes the type A subjects switch to
a high cognitive approach and re-compute what would be fair to give out, is an actual request
from the type B subjects, which is based on hard evidence. This re-computation is made even
when it comes at a monetary cost for them, and more importantly, even if that would not be
perceived as unfair by the type B subjects.
Altruism and the pressure to share
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0212747 May 21, 2019 14 / 19
Overall, this shows how strong the social norms can be, as they may induce the economic
agents to stick their actions to predetermined choices, even if this can be socially inefficient or
even detrimental for them.
Summing up, there is supporting evidence for the conjecture that type A subjects decide ex-
ante to base their giving on the outcome of the investment only if they face claims that are
based on hard evidence of this outcome. Otherwise, they decide before the outcome of the
investment is known how much to give. If they have spent money to hide, and so to avoid the
no hide and claim situation, they externalize this cost within the amount they give. This conjec-
ture seems to describe a behavior that is based on social norms, and seems to support the possi-
bility that subjects are not only driven by intrinsic motivation, in the form of utility derived
from the actual allocation of resources among themselves and their peers.
5. Conclusions
Social networks in the developing world, such as kinship or extended families, are character-
ized by high level of pro sociality of their members. Individuals share resources and obtain a
wide range of important services from the network, such as insurance and credit, labor inputs,
when markets are imperfect or absent. An important feature of these networks is that they are
characterized by the moral imperative to share resources among their members. In this paper
we presented the results of an experiment conducted in rural Tanzania. The experiment is
framed as a typical social network in a developing country with close links to kinship and
extended family. We designed a novel modified dictator game with multiple recipients where
in some treatments the subjects are allowed to claim some of the resources from the senders
they are related to. The senders in some treatments had, instead, the possibility to hide their
resources at a cost. This allows the testing behavioral responses both in terms of investment
and giving decision under redistributive pressure. We find experimental evidence highlighting
the detrimental impact of sharing pressure on the likelihood of undertaking investments.
These are, indeed, smaller when the possibility of redistributive pressure is larger. We also doc-
umented how important the sharing norms are in dictating giving and how individuals may
engage in costly activities such as hiding to prevent resource reallocation. We establish a link
between hiding and pressure avoidance in the context of risky investments, and we explain its
rationale with the help of a hypothesis based on rational inattention.
From a societal perspective, the redistributive pressure may result in a significant negative
impact on economic development; either directly through less investment and costly hiding
activities or indirectly since fewer resources are available for investment due to sharing or both
([2, 18–19, 36, 75]). Hiding is a behavioral shelter. It provides the possibility to reduce the
amount of giving and reduce social network pressure to redistribute resources. In our context,
hiding provides a way to shelter against giving in response to redistributive pressure support-
ing that giving within the network seems in fact driven by sense of duty and sharing norms.
Our results contribute to this debate by showing the underlying behavioral mechanisms, their
consequences in terms of sharing and in terms of investment. Findings are consistent with
dual reasoning approaches.
At this stage some caveats are necessary. First, like in any study of this nature, further exper-
imental research is needed to scale up and generalize our results in variety of different settings
(e.g., different countries, lab in the field etc.). Second, it would be extremely important to
study how different degrees of uncertainty or the size of the network may quantitatively or
qualitatively the results. Future research should address these issues as well as studying more
in depth how improving market access to credit or insurance may affect the patterns that we
have documented in this paper.
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